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1 Introduction
ReSIST is a NoE that addresses the strategic objective
“Towards a global dependability and security framework”
of the European Union Work Programme, and responds to
the stated “need for resilience, self-healing, dynamic con-
tent and volatile environments”. In the context of the Resist
Network of Excellence, funds were allocated to one-year
sub-projects addressing some of the “dependability and se-
curity gaps” identified by the network activity. We intro-
duce here the outcomes and deliverables expected by one of
these sub-projects, named “Honeypots”, started in January
2008 and with expected completion at the end of 2008.
In order to assess the resilience of a system it is impor-
tant to take into consideration malicious faults. In the spe-
cific case of a computer system, one of the most important
classes of malicious faults is linked to Internet attacks. The
gap GA2 in [13] shows how the lack of unbiased, represen-
tative and useful data poses a serious limitation to any at-
tempt of quantifying and characterizing the security threats
to which a computer system may be exposed. Despite the
considerable number of ongoing projects [17, 3, 4, 1, 6]
aiming at collecting data about Internet malicious activities,
the lack of “good” data with respect to this objective is an
important gap of the current state of the art. Also, there is a
lack of rigorous methodologies and models that can be used
to extract relevant information and trends from the collected
data.
In this project we want to address an interesting sub-
problem of this gap: classify and characterize real-world In-
ternet attacks linked to the spread of self-propagating mal-
ware. While the scenario of Internet attacks in the past was
characterized by a few but extremely visible phenomena
linked to the spread of worms, nowadays’ scenario is far
more complex. The objectives of the hackers have changed,
and what started as a competition to gain visibility by in-
fecting large populations of machines in very short time
has now become a more organized covert activity aiming
at economical profit. Internet is now dominated by a large
number of different classes of malware aiming at silently
taking control of computer systems in order to steal bank-
ing accounts, generate spam, steal credit card numbers, and
many other profit-oriented operations. Even if the presence
of these different classes is of public knowledge, we lack
quantitative information on their spread, on their impact, on
their evolution. This project aims at investigating the fea-
sibility of using real data provided by honeypots to obtain
such information.
2 Project activity
We plan to collect data taking advantage of a distributed
honeypot deployment, developed at Institut Eurecom, called
SGNET [8, 9]. SGNET aims at deploying small sensors in
different locations of the IP space. These sensors emulate
network services and, taking advantage of the ScriptGen
technology [10, 11], achieve a very high level of verbosity at
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a very low cost. With respect to existing honeypot deploy-
ments, SGNET allows to achieve an extremely rich amount
of information about the network activities hitting the hon-
eypot, with special focus on code injection attacks. SGNET
is in fact able to emulate the whole attack trace, understand-
ing the presence of a successful code injection, and emulat-
ing its behavior ultimately downloading samples of the mal-
ware. This process allows to retrieve extremely valuable in-
formation about the intention of the attacker and its nature.
This information is stored in a relational database for fur-
ther analysis and constitutes the foundation over which we
are planning to work within this project.
The “Honeypots” project aims at exploiting the informa-
tion collected by the SGNET deployment. The project ac-
tivity will follow two main lines of operation. Firstly, we
will enrich the collected data through the comparison with
other information sources. Secondly, we will dig into the
collected data and try to abstract meaningful information
taking advantage of existing algorithms developed by the
participants in different contexts.
2.1 Correlation with other information
sources
Some of the participants to the project manage different
honeypot deployments taking advantage of different tech-
nologies. These technologies range from Honeynet Al-
liance deployments [1] to other high interaction techniques
[2]. The reasons underneath the comparison of the informa-
tion collected by different techniques are twofold. On the
one hand, the diversity in collection techniques may allow
to detect “blindness” of one approach to security events ob-
served by the other approach. On the other hand, combining
diverse information retrieved using different approaches po-
tentially allows to enrich and consolidate the global view on
the observed security events.
City University has deployed several high-interaction
honeypots, which contain a mixture of Linux and Windows
hosts and following the directions of the Honeynet Alliance
[1]. These deployments emulate the traffic observed in cor-
porate or SME (Small to Medium Business) environments.
The network traffic collected in these honeynets will be
compared with the SGNET data, e.g. exploratory analysis
of the times between attacks on different hosts, operating
systems, networks or geographical location will be detailed.
Mondragon University will proceed on the same line of
City University, but from a different perspective. Mon-
dragon University will provide a very rich dataset collected
by around 10 honeypots of the Basque Honeynet Alliance
[12]. This will allow to a very interesting comparison with
the information provided by the SGNET deployment. The
comparison will focus on different parameters than those
analyzed by City University. For instance, both honeypot
deployments being able to download malware using differ-
ent strategies, we will compare the trends in malware down-
load offered by the two technologies.
LAAS University will exploit the previous work on high
interaction honeypots [2] to observe the behavior of attack-
ers once they manage to get access to the core of the sys-
tem. We plan to use this information to be able to provide
answers to fundamental questions such as “what attackers
do in the core of the system?” And “what are their objec-
tives?”. The goal is to better understand the motivations
and methods of attackers. One way to achieve this goal is to
study the sequence of commands performed by the attack-
ers, using clustering techniques and symbolic time series.
2.2 Data enrichment through analysis
The information retrieved by the honeypot deployments
is vast. In order to build characterizations of the observed
security events we need a set of tools and techniques to mine
the collected data and extract more meaningful aggregate
information. We plan to take advantage of existing algo-
rithms developed by some of the participants to the project
to achieve this goal. The data mining techniques developed
in the context of the Leurre´.com honeypot deployment [5]
can be of great help in organizing the collected data. Time
series analysis developed in the context of IDS alert analy-
sis [16] and statistical modelling [7] can help us in digging
into the data filtering out uninteresting activities.
The data mining algorithms developed at Eurecom have
been used so far to discover similarity patterns between the
attacks over extended periods of time (e.g. several months
or years). This long term analysis has already delivered in-
teresting results about certain classes of malicious activities
that seem to be correlated over long periods of time. In or-
der to better address the highly dynamic and changing be-
havior new emerging threats, and also to understand how the
threats evolve over time, we need to effectively identify the
relevant periods of attack activities (i.e. the “attack events”)
on our sensors prior the execution of any correlative analy-
sis. France Telecom R&D will provide its expertise in time
series analysis [15, 14] to identify attack events within the
honeypot time series. This can increase the quality and the
significance of the results of the correlation algorithms de-
veloped by Eurecom. The final objective is to combine and
automate both approaches (detection and correlation) so as
to facilitate the processing of large quantities of data and
to improve the discovery of meaningful information from
honeypot data.
Eurecom will also provide an extension of its correlation
framework in order to take advantage of the extensive in-
formation provided by SGNET. Such an extension will be
used in the second half of the project to conduct an exten-
sive analysis, so as to understand and characterize the evo-
34
lution of malware activities in both the time domain and in
the “spatial” domain (i.e. along the Internet IP space).
Attackers can use intruded nodes to disrupt the operation
of distributed systems, for example by creating inconsis-
tencies in a distributed file system where data is replicated
on multiple machines to guarantee integrity and availability.
Since tolerance to intrusions (or in general Byzantine faults)
is expensive, it is important to estimate how many faults are
to be tolerated. TU Darmstadt will look at the Honeypot
data to answer this question for systems that are subject to
untargeted attacks.
3 Conclusions
Summarizing, the “Honeypots” project aims at exploring
the feasibility of characterizing Internet attacks by digging
into the information collected by different honeypot deploy-
ments. We hope to achieve this through the joint efforts of
researchers with different competencies and resources. The
ultimate goal of the project is providing a significant step to-
wards the collection of unbiased, representative and useful
data on real world attacks.
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